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ARTICLES
NOT THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: THE CASE OF
DRUGS IN THE COURTS
STEVEN WISOTSKY*
The history of the narcotics legislation in this country
reveals the determination of Congress to turn the screw
of the criminal machinery - detection, prosecution and
punishment - tighter and tighter.
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981)
The world we have created as a result of the level of
thinking we have done thus far creates problems that can-
not be solved at the same level at which we created them.
Albert Einstein i
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of the United States and the United
States Courts of Appeals have contributed to the generally pre-
vailing confusion, ignorance and prejudice surrounding drug
control laws and enforcement policies in this country. Rather
than deciding drug law issues based upon the actual effects of
drugs and drug control laws, these courts have in the main sub-
stituted rhetoric for reason and parroted the "party line" on
drugs: That is, there is a need "to combat a national drug
problem of epidemic proportion ' and that "the federal gov-
ernment's efforts to contain and beat back the drug scourge...
depend importantly on convincing all Americans that drug use
* Professor of Law, Nova Law Center; B.A., 1967, University of
Pennsylvania; J.D., 1970, University of Miami; L.L.M., 1971, Yale University.
1. S. WISOTSKY, BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS 1 (1990) (quoting A.
Einstein) [hereinafter BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS].
2. United States v. Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, 890 F.2d 659,
665 (3rd Cir. 1989) (dissenting opinion). Justice Kennedy used substantially
similar language to uphold the Customs Service's drug testing program in
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 485 U.S. 903 (1988).
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is as much a danger to them and to our country as is an exter-
nal enemy. '
Few opinions combine careful reasoning and attention to
evidence or empirical knowledge; we are left instead with drug
law decisions based mainly on metaphors of outrage at drug
users and sellers. Courts denounce the "degeneracy" of
"moral perverts," and call them "vampires" or the "walking
dead" engaged in "ugly" and "insidious" drug distribution
offenses. Generations of scientific research, scholarly analysis,
and the reports of learned commissions have been almost com-
pletely ignored. The Supreme Court of the United States has
never cited the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug
Abuse, the Mayor's Committee on The Marijuana Problem in
the City of New York, the Panama Canal Zone Military Investi-
gations, or any of the classic drug policy studies of Canada and
Great Britain in opinions concerning drug laws.4 Instead, the
volumes of the United States Reports and the Federal
Reporter5 are filled with emotionally charged dicta mimicking
the political rhetoric that has dominated drug control in the
United States since its inception. Consequently, the courts
have reinforced congressional determination to "turn the
screw" on criminal procedure and have struck a constitutional
balance in favor of law enforcement and against individual
3. Harmon v. Thornburgh, 878 F.2d 484, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(Silberman, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Silberman
thought that the majority had unduly restricted the scope of the
Government's drug testing program while personally expressing "grave
doubts that the criminal law is the most effective way of dealing with our drug
problem . I..." d.
4. Other learned commission reports not referred to include the INDIAN
HEMP DRUGS COMMISSION, MARIJUANA, 1893-94; DEPARTMENTAL COMMITrEE
ON MORPHINE AND HEROIN ADDICTION (1926) [hereinafter ROLLESTON
REPORT]; DRUG ADDICTION: CRIME OR DISEASE?, Interim and Final Reports,
Joint Committee of the American Bar Association and the American Medical
Association on Narcotic Drugs (1961); Interdepartmental Committee, DRUG
ADDICTION (1961) [hereinafter BRAIN I]; Interdepartmental Committee,
DRUG ADDICTION, SECOND REPORT (1965) [hereinafter BRAIN II]; Advisory
Committee on Drug Dependence, CANNABIS (1968) [hereinafter THE
WOOTON REPORT]; Canadian Commission of Inquiry, THE NON-MEDICAL USE
OF DRUGS, INTERIM REPORT (1970) [hereinafter LEDAIN REPORT]; National
Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, AN ANALYSIS OF
MARIJUANA POLICY (1982).
5. Overall, the various courts of appeal have performed with greater
intellectual rigor than the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Moore,
416 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973); The National Organization for Reform of
Marijuana Laws v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 559 F.2d 735 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1973).
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rights.6 Courts have not advanced the cause of intelligent
debate about drug policy.
I. THE WAR(S) ON DRUGS
The original war on drugs was fought by U.S. Treasury
Agents in the decade following passage of the Harrison Narcot-
ics Act of 1914, 7 which brought cocaine and opiates under fed-
eral control for the first time. A second war was organized
around the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, when Federal Bureau
of Narcotics Commissioner Harry Anslinger told Congress the
Act was necessary to stop the "marihuana menace" exemplified
by teenage gangs who became violent and murderous after
smoking marijuana.8 A third drug war was officially declared
by President Richard Nixon; in a message to Congress he por-
trayed drug abuse as a "national emergency." Branding it
"public enemy number one," he called for a "total offensive. '
The drug war that currently has the eye and ear of the
American public, or at least the mass media, is the one
launched on October 2, 1982, by President Ronald Reagan. In
response to Congressional pressure"0 and widespread commu-
nity support," he committed his Administration to a War on
Drugs:
The mood towards drugs is changing in this country and
the momentum is with us. We are making no excuses for
drugs - hard, soft, or otherwise. Drugs are bad and we
are going after them.
12
6. Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 883 (1987) [hereinafter Crackdown].
7. Harrison Narcotic Act, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (1914) (current version at
21 U.S.C. §§ 801-969 (1981)). See generally King, Punishing the Sick and Jailing
the Healers, 62 YALE L.J. 736 (1953).
8. For accounts of the "killer weed" scenario, see Bonnie &
Whitebread, The Forbidden Fruit and the Tree of Knowledge: An Inquiry into the
Legal History ofAmerican Marijuana Prohibition, 56 VA. L. REV. 971 (1970), and.J.
HIMMELSTEIN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF MARIJUANA: POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY
OF DRUG CONTROL IN AMERICA 49 (1983).
9. E.J. EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR 178 (1977).
10. The House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control had
urged the President to declare war on drugs. H.R. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. pts 1-2, at 50 (1982).
11. Approximately 3,000 parents' groups had organized across the
nation under the aegis of the National Federation of Parents for Drug Free
Youth. Gonzalez, The War on Drugs: A Special Report, PLAYBOY, Apr. 1982, at
134. Pamphlets of Informed Parents of Dade put the number of such groups
at nearly 6,000 in the 1985-86 period.
12. President's Radio Address to the Nation, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 1249 (Oct. 2, 1982).
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Twelve days later, in a speech at the Department ofJustice, the
President pledged an "unshakable commitment... to do what
is necessary to end the drug menace.""3
There ensued the greatest build-up and mobilization of
law enforcement resources in American history to combat
drugs: the CIA, the FBI, DEA, Customs, the State Department,
U.S. AID, the Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy, NASA and other
services were drawn together and deployed in a futile effort to
stem the tide of drugs imported into the U.S. Despite Gramm
Rudman, the drug enforcement budget rose by a factor of ten-
fold, from about $1.2 billion in 1981 to roughly 10 billion in
1990.14
Congress, for its part, not only supplied the funds for this
war but repealed many of the procedural protections previ-
ously guaranteed to those accused of crime, such as a presump-
tion in favor of pretrial release on bail. 5 It also increased
severely the penalties for most drug offenses, moving from
long maximum prison terms to severe mandatory prison terms,
and then to the death penalty for certain persons convicted as
drug "kingpins" under the Continuing Criminal Enterprise
Statute. 36
Yet by the close of the decade, after numerous escalations,
domestic and foreign, and billions of dollars in expenditures,
the drug problem was perceived by the public, according to a
Gallup poll undertaken at the request of drug "czar" William
Bennett, as having gotten out of control. The public perceived
drugs as the nation's number one problem, so bad as to justify
curtailment of personal freedoms. 7
In response to this perception of crisis, President Bush,
having previously pledged to stop cocaine, "the scourge of this
Hemisphere," declared a further escalation in the War on
Drugs. In a televised address to the nation on September 5,
1989, he announced the impending dispatch of military equip-
ment to Colombia to support a less rhetorical war against the
13. 18 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1311, 1314 (Oct. 14, 1982).
14. N.Y. Times, April 22, 1990, at 6E (city ed.).
15. The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 created a
presumption in favor of pretrial detention for any person accused of a ten-
year drug felony. 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (1990).
16. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1989).
17. A New York Times/CBS poll based on telephone interviews
conducted September 6-8, 1989 produced similar results. Sixty-four percent
cited drugs as the most important problem facing the nation-triple the
percentage of July, 1989. Sixty-one percent favored drug testing of workers
generally. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1989, at B8, col. 1.
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Cocaine Cartels of Medellin and Cali. Despite these aggressive
escalations in the "War on Drugs" at home and abroad, drug
suppliers enjoyed a raging bull market throughout the 1980's.
Cocaine flooded into the country in multi-ton cargo shipments.
Federal authorities seized 198,000 pounds in 1988, more than
the total supply to the U.S. black market in 1981.18 Marijuana,
with imports pinched off by Coast Guard interdiction of
"mother ships" in the Caribbean, became a major agricultural
venture in the United States itself.'9
The media incessantly reported the permeability of U.S.
borders to cocaine, marijuana and heroin smugglers. The rise
of drug-based urban terrorism compounded the situation.
There were reports of burglaries and robberies committed by
addicts in search of the next fix; drive-by shootings in the strug-
gle for control of urban turf; and warfare between competing
drug gangs armed with automatic weapons. Washington, D.C.
led the list of cities in per capita "drug-related" homicides.
The violence affected struggling democratic governments in
Latin America, as Colombia and Peru teetered on the edge of
drug-financed civil war, and at home, media accounts noted the
widespread drug-money corruption in big-city police depart-
ments in Miami, New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles.
Despite the severity of the social and political problems
engendered by the $100 billion black market in illegal drugs -
marijuana, cocaine, and heroin - never once did any branch of
the Government seriously consider the soundness of the prem-
ises of the "War on Drugs." No one considered whether the
"War on Drugs" "cure" may be worse than the drug abuse
"disease." The only questions seriously debated have been in
what way and to what extent should the existing war expand:
whether to spend 10 or 12 billion dollars, whether to shoot sus-
pected drug smuggling planes from the sky, whether to impose
the death penalty upon drug traffickers who did not kill,
whether to assassinate foreign traffickers beyond the reach of
18. See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, DRUG ABUSE
PREVENTION AND CONTROL: BUDGET AUTHORITY FOR FEDERAL PROGRAMS, FY
1986-FY 1988 (Feb. 27, 1987):
Despite a doubling of Federal expenditures on interdiction over the
past five years, the quantity of drugs smuggled into the United
States is greater than ever . . . . There is no clear correlation
between the level of expenditures or effort devoted to interdiction
and the long-term availability of illegally imported drugs in the
domestic market.
See also Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 1305.
19. BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS, supra note 1, at xix.
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the U.S. justice system, whether to fully deploy military forces
in drug law enforcement operations, etc.
The reason for the single-minded intensity of the crack-
down mentality is simple - "drugs are bad," in the words of
President Reagan, and "we are going after them." Although a
catchy political sound-byte, "drugs are bad," is far from being a
factual proposition. Instead it is an incoherent claim, as no
meaningful statement about the effects of drugs (or alcohol)
can be made without considering several fundamental vari-
ables, such as the particular drug, the dosage, frequency of use
(habitual, occasional), the purpose of use (therapeutic, recrea-
tional), and the physical, personal and social circumstances of
the user.
That "drugs are bad" falsely presupposes there is a bona
fide distinction on health and welfare grounds between socially
approved and outlawed drugs. Some Schedule I drugs, defined
as drugs with high potential for abuse and no accepted use in
medical practice, were in fact once accepted in medicinal use
and were later banned on political and legal grounds.2 ° Thus,
marijuana was listed in the U.S. Pharmacopeia as a recognized
medicine from 1850-1942; heroin was in use until 1924.21
Conversely, socially accepted drugs, such as alcohol and
tobacco are protected today by mass consumer denial. Alcohol
and tobacco are not called drugs in ordinary conversation, nor
are they considered controlled substances under the law. Yet
the human destruction from these two drugs is enormous.
Reports of the Surgeon General consistently attribute about
1,000 deaths per day ---r 360,000 annual deaths - to lung can-
cer, cardiovascular disease and other diseases caused by ciga-
rette smoking.2 2 The number of alcoholics or "problem
drinkers" in the United States is an estimated 10-12 million
and the alcohol death toll runs around 50,000-200,000 divided
roughly equally between direct morbidity, (e.g. cirrhosis of the
liver) and traumatic deaths (as in automobile and industrial
accidents) in which drunkenness is thought to be the cause. 23
20. For the listing of schedules of controlled substances, see 21 U.S.C.
§ 821 (a)-(d) (1989).
21. T. SZASZ, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY: THE RITUAL PERSECUTION OF
DRUGS, ADDICTS AND PUSHERS 183 (1974).
22. BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS, supra note 1, at 186.
23. Id. at 187. Directly comparable data for illegal drugs is difficult to
come by because of the crudeness of the Government's data collection
system, the failure of the Government to fund long-term research into the
extent and effects of long-term non-abusive illegal drug use, and the natural
reluctance of people to volunteer information of criminal conduct. The two
major techniques used by the government to track illicit drug use are the
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The minimal legal controls placed on alcohol and tobacco,
on the one hand, and the total prohibition on the non-medical
use of marijuana, cocaine and heroin, on the other, cannot be
justified by any rational assessment of the known physical or
psychological effects of these drugs on the consumer or society.
The literature of science and of drug policy reveals compelling
evidence of the vast gulf between law and medicine in the legal
status of drugs. 24 The point of this article is that the judiciary,
like the political branches, has to a significant degree 25 ignored
the evidence and the authorities, marching to the drum beat of
the war on drugs.
II. THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN DRUG CONTROL
Ignorance and irrational fears have driven the drug control
system from its inception with enactment of the Harrison Nar-
cotics Act of 1914. As an abstract proposition, the irrationality
of the drug control system is not especially remarkable; irra-
tionality in the political arena is not after all surprising or unex-
pected. What is remarkable is the extent to which the
irrationality is shared by the judicial branch, the branch institu-
tionally committed to knowledge and reason. Even tough-
minded judges at the highest levels of the federal judicial sys-
tem, such as William Douglas and Hugo Black, have generally
followed the crowd in this domain of drugs, embracing uncriti-
cally what J.S. Mill called "the tyranny of majority opinion." 26
Judges who have been called upon to answer drug law pol-
icy questions arising as issues of statutory interpretation or
constitutional challenge have abandoned the method of fact-
based, reasoned elaboration that is the essence of thinking like
a lawyer or deciding like a judge.27 In place of careful analysis,
National Institute of Drug Abuse Household Survey and the Drug Abuse
Warning Network. See infra at nn. 77-78.
24. One author argues quite powerfully that the differential treatment
of the legal and illegal drugs arises from tradition and culture-particularly
the deep-rooted psycho-social need to identify some substances as taboo-
rather than any inherent properties of the drugs themselves. T. Szasz, supra
note 21, at 18-25.
25. There are of course voices of reason on the federal bench. But as
in the rest of society, they appear to be a minority. For one recent example of
the dialectical tension between acceptance and questioning of the
presuppositions of the war on drugs, see the majority opinion of Justice
Kennedy and the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia in National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 485 U.S. 903 (1988).
26. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 5 (1940).
27. See K. LLEWELYN, THE COMMON LAw TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
(1961); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921).
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judges have attempted to justify drug law decisions with misin-
formation or inflammatory rhetoric.
Indeed, there is often little difference between what is said
by politicians and what is written by judges. Compare, for
example, the September 12, 1989 televised speech by President
Bush to the nation's schoolchildren.
Drugs have no conscience ... . They just murder peo-
ple. Young and old, good and bad, innocent and guilty
- it doesn't matter.28
with the drug dealer as "vampire" image of the Fifth Circuit or
the opinion of the Chief Judge of the Southern District of Flor-
ida, who condemned drug dealers as "merchants of misery,
destruction and death" whose greed has wrought "hideous
evil" and "unimaginable sorrow" upon the nation. 29 The
result of the comparison is that there is no difference between
the executive and judicial branches on this drug war.
Even where the rhetoric is not so inflammatory, judges
have nevertheless demonstrated that they share the fears and
prejudices of the larger society. Cases reviewed here do not
show a spirit of inquiry into facts but instead argument rooted
in a priori assumptions. The opinions generally display indif-
ference to facts; empiricism bows to orthodoxy. The opinions
do not acknowledge gaps in information generally or in the
record of the particular case under review; nor distinguish
between fact and supposition; nor cite scientific studies on the
properties of drugs or the economic effects of drug enforce-
ment; nor differentiate among illegal drugs or make relevant
comparisons to legal ones; nor acknowledge the secondary
costs of drug enforcement arising from the black market "crime
tariff";-" nor fairly balance or otherwise attend to competing
values of individual liberty and privacy. The opinions generally
do not display the qualities of mind that constitute the critical
judgment to be expected of judges."' Instead, the operative
premise is that "drugs are bad," so bad that almost any law or
law enforcement measure is validated.
28. Bush Gives Anti-Drug Talk to Kids, Miami Herald, Sept. 13, 1989, at
IA.
29. United States v. Miranda, 442 F. Supp. 786, 795 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
30. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 177 (1969).
31. See R. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS (1989); W. READ, LEGAL
THINKING (1986). See also M. ROMBAUER, LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING (1973).
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III. DRUG IMAGERY IN THE CASES
There are two primary images in the cases on drugs. The
original and still dominant theme is addiction as enslavement
by drugs.32 This imagery springs from a dark palette of words
and phrases in the cases discussed below: "misery, destruction,
and death"; "degradation"; "debasement"; "shameful";
"depravity"; "degeneracy"; "evil." The second major theme is
drug trafficking as an "insidious crime" that reinforces the sub-
jugation of the addict, causing crime and violence and inflicting
"unimaginable sorrow" on society.
The earliest drug cases reached the Supreme Court not
long after drug control (historically a matter left to the police
power of the States,) was federalized by the Harrison Narcotics
Act of 1914. The Harrison Act made it an offense to dispense
heroin, cocaine and other narcotics except on forms issued by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The prohibition, how-
ever, did not apply to a physician distributing drugs to a patient
in the course of his professional practice. In a series of cases
interpreting the Act and challenging its constitutional validity,
the Supreme Court demonstrated its own "drugs-are-bad"
philosophy.
In United States v. Doremus,33 the Supreme Court reversed
the dismissal of an indictment against a physician for violating
Section 2 of the Harrison Act. The indictment alleged that
Doremus unlawfully distributed to a man named Ameris 500
one-sixth grain tablets of heroin, without using the prescribed
forms, and with knowledge that Ameris was addicted to the
drug and was a "dope fiend." The Court condemned the doc-
tor for "gratifying his (Ameris') appetite for the drug as a habit-
ual user thereof" 4 without considering the arguments for
maintaining an addict on drugs under medical supervision -
that it "may . . . become justifiable in certain cases to order
regularly the minimum dose which has been found necessary,
either in order to avoid serious withdrawal symptoms, or to
32. The Harrison Act was motivated in substantial part by the large
addict population that developed around the easy access in the U.S. to potent
patent medicines. D. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF
NARCOTICS CONTROL (1973); J. PHILLIPS & R. WYNNE, COCAINE: THE
MYSTIQUE AND THE REALITY 78-80 (1980). In both the U.S. and Europe
widespread "fear and loathing" of cocaine developed not long after Freud's
popularization of the drug in the 1880s. R. BYCK, THE COCAINE PAPERS OF
SIGMUND FREUD (1974).
33. 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
34. Id. at 90.
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keep the patient in a condition in which he can lead a useful
life." 3 5
The Doremus indictment was brought as part of the Federal
Government's sustained campaign to put an end to the practice
of addiction maintenance, a goal that it largely achieved by the
mid-1920s. In the attack on addiction maintenance, approxi-
mately 25,000 physicians were indicted, and over 3,000 actually
went to prison.36 The hostile attitude toward drug dependence
underlying that campaign comes into sharper relief in United
States v. Behrman,3 7 where a doctor prescribed take-home drugs
to an addict named King as treatment for withdrawal and pro-
vided no supervision for its use. The prescription was lawful if
regarded as being in the course of the doctor's professional
practice. The district court dismissed the indictment, as it did
not allege a lack of good faith on the part of the doctor, and
held that the statute did not prohibit prescribing maintenance
doses to addicts.
Noting the legislative purpose "to confine the distribution
of these drugs to the regular and lawful course of professional
practice,"138 the Supreme Court reversed. The Court con-
cluded that such "so-called prescriptions could only result in
the gratification of a diseased appetite for these pernicious
drugs" or an unlawful diversion of them to others by the
addict, restrained only by an addict's "weakened and perverted
will." 39
The quantities of drugs involved in Behrman as in Doremus,
permitted an inference that the prescriptions were being re-
sold on the black market. King had obtained 150 grains of her-
35. Ministry of Health, Departmental Committee on Morphine and
Heroin Addiction, Report at 18, cited in A. TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLTrnON 85
(1982). This report, also known as the Rolleston Report, was not issued until
1926, and obviously could not have been cited by the Supreme Court in these
early cases. However, the medical practices which the report endorses did
exist at the time; Trebach states that the Rolleston report "codified the best
of the common law of medical practice." Id. at 90. There was no good
reason for the Supreme Court simply to ignore popular and professional
accounts supporting the legitimacy and efficacy of addiction maintenance.
36. King, supra note 7.
37. 258 U.S. 280 (1921).
38. Id. at 287.
39. Id. at 289. The district court had written earlier in a similar vein:
"'The so-called 'patient' in this case was suffering from no disease except
drug addiction .... [I]t is a well known fact, of which this court has taken
notice, that drug addicts as a class are persons weakened materially in their
sense of responsibility and in their power of will .. " Id. at 281.
That generalization is certainly not a fact so well known as to dispense
with the need for proof and justify the taking of judicial notice.
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oin, 360 grains of morphine, and 210 grains of cocaine, which
the Court pointed out was equivalent to three thousand ordi-
nary doses. Reinstatement of the indictment here might have
been defended in light of the abuse of the professional privi-
lege. What is remarkable is the contempt shown by the Court
for the addict, as though he were something less than human -
possessed of a "diseased appetite" and a "perverted will." By
comparison, it is difficult to imagine the Supreme Court of the
United States using similar language of condemnation in deter-
mining whether other conduct constitutes murder, rape or
other crime.40
For the next several decades, the Supreme Court made no
further pronouncements on drugs. A few cases did arise in the
lower federal courts, where judges further developed the
theme of degradation and debasement. For example, in Menna
v. Menna,4' a wife alleged in a divorce suit grounds of "moral
turpitude" on the part of her husband for being twice con-
victed of Harrison Narcotics Act violations. The court agreed
that moral turpitude was established by the violations, even
though the Harrison Act was a revenue statute administered by
the Department of the Treasury.
The court in Menna stated that "it has become a matter of
general knowledge that the habitual use of opium produces
crime, violence, brutality and insanity."' 4' The Court even went
so far as to adduce "proof" that drugs are criminogenic, citing
the Narcotic Bureau's Report for 1937 that 63% of the drug
law violators arrested in that year had previous criminal
records. This "proof" completely dispensed with an elemen-
tary question of cause and effect: were the individuals made
criminals as a result of using drugs, or were they using drugs
because they were criminals?
The opinion presumes to answer the defendant's personal
culpability in the divorce suit by reference to the wrongdoing
of others, a form of guilt by association. 43 Even the guilt by
40. Justices Holmes, McReynolds and Brandeis dissented. A few years
later in Linder v. United States, 268 U.S. 5 (1925), a doctor was indicted for
prescribing one tablet of morphine and three tablets of cocaine to a woman
he knew to be addicted to these drugs in order to satisfy her craving. The
Supreme Court viewed the case as a conviction for a prescription with "the
sole purpose of relieving conditions incident to addiction and keeping [the
patient] comfortable." It was not willing to find that Dr. Linder had
"necessarily transcended" the limits of professional practice. Id. at 19.
41. 102 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
42. Id. at 618.
43. Guilt by association is done in later cases, such as Carmona v.
Ward, infra note 79, and Terrebone v. Butler, infra note 90.
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association is deeply flawed, the moral turpitude simply
assumed from the "common knowledge" that opium is harm-
ful. That the appellant therefore committed "wicked and
shameful acts" is not, in the court's view, truly open to ques-
tion or in need of proof:
There can be . . . no question of doubt in anyone's
mind that the peddler of these dangerous drugs is a men-
ace to society. Nor can there be the slightest doubt that
the crime which it is the purpose of the statute to punish
is one involving moral turpitude.
An act which creates human misery, corruption, and
moral ruin in the lives of individuals is necessarily so base
and shameful as to leave the offender not wanting in the
depravity which the words "moral turpitude" imply.44
This is extravagant talk for a court that needed only to
decide whether the plaintiff in a divorce action had grounds for
divorce by reason of the defendant having been convicted of
two Harrison Act violations. The court could have rested its
decision on the ground that a felony conviction, by definition,
demonstrates moral turpitude. Perhaps the court could have
characterized the conviction as a rebuttable presumption of
moral turpitude, and examined the statute to see whether the
Harrison Act violations were offenses malum in se. The court
did not consider questions of strict liability or criminal intent.
More importantly, the court failed to examine the facts
underlying the convictions. Did the appellant's particular crim-
inal acts cause actual "misery, corruption and moral ruin" to
some identifiable victim(s)? Did his acts create a risk of such
harm, and if so, how great was that risk? The court ignored
these obvious questions in its zeal to condemn a "base and
shameless" "menace to society"."
44. Id.
45. A later case similarly cites "the common knowledge of society" that
addicts are indecent people:
The violation of the narcotic drug laws . . . is a violation of a rule
which is accepted by all decent people as involving public policy and
morals in the United States. The evils which the illicit narcotic traffic
brings in its wake are all well known and they are rightfully the subject
of public abhorrence .... In my opinion it is clearly demonstrated
that either class of offense involves moral turpitude.
It is common knowledge that narcotics addicts must, and will in
order to obtain a supply of the drug to which they are addicted, lie,
cheat or steal. Constant deception and subterfuge are necessary, if
an addict is to remain at liberty and to enjoy the dubious boon of his
addiction. United States v. Cisneros, 191 F. Supp. 924 (D. Cal.
1961) (emphasis supplied).
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In Burke v. Kansas State Osteopathic Association, Inc. ,46 the
court held that Kansas law did not confer upon osteopaths, as
distinct from physicians, the right to administer narcotic drugs:
All legislation respecting the use or any limitation on the
use of narcotics, is based upon the established fact that
narcotic drugs are dangerous. Not that they are poisons
within themselves, but are worse than poisons. Their
excessive use destroys will power, ambition, self-respect,
and in the end, mentality. They make men and women
moral perverts. Their influence upon society is most
degrading . .47
In reaching this decision, the court quoted from pop articles
warning about the "drug curse," "the evils that come from
drugs" and the like. The "established fact" that narcotic drugs
are "worse than poisons" which make people "moral perverts"
must rank among the most outrageous of anti-drug assertions
in the judicial literature. Even the statement that excessive use
destroys "mentality" goes beyond the pale of anything resem-
bling reasoned legal discourse. Such language resembles a
kind of hellfire-and-brimstone sermon pitting the righteous
(virtuous lawmakers) against the wicked (drug users).
As in the Menna case, the judicial denunciations are gratui-
tous; the court had ample grounds on which to base its decision
in the definition of osteopathy as being "fundamentally differ-
ent" in its natural orientation from the practice of medicine
involving the administration of drugs. Alternatively, the court
might have confined its ground of decision to a simple determi-
nation of the legislative intent underlying the Kansas law.
Both Menna and Burke display an inexcusable ignorance
about the effects of drugs and the nature of addiction. Unlike
the early Supreme Court cases on Harrison Act issues, the
courts of appeals had available to them, in addition to domestic
scientific literature, the 1926 Rolleston Committee Report, the
landmark study by a distinguished group of British physicians
acknowledging the existence of stable addicts and approving
the practice of addiction maintenance. Although the issues
before the courts in Menna and Burke were different, those deci-
sions surely could have been improved by consideration of that
medical perspective. Rather than speaking in metaphors of
"depravity" and "poisons," those courts could have learned
that addiction may be considered a disease. The Report
defined "addict" as "a person who, not requiring the continued
46. 111 F.2d 250 (10th Cir. 1940).
47. Id. at 256.
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use of a drug for the relief of symptoms of organic disease, has
acquired, as a result of repeated administration, an overpower-
ing desire for its continuance, and in whom withdrawal of the
drug leads to definite symptoms of mental or physical distress
or disorder."48 Rolleston's reluctant endorsement of addiction
maintenance, as a last resort, need not be accepted in order to
view the addict as a person rather than as a "moral pervert"
lacking "mentality." One of the ironies of these cases, con-
taining some of the hottest anti-drug rhetoric in the reporter
system, is that they were decided at a time (1939-40) when the
black market in illicit drugs was at its nadir. Apparently, the
fears survived an earlier societal scare.
Drug-related issues resurfaced in the Supreme Court in
the 1960s. The first, Robinson v. California,49 presented the con-
stitutional validity of a California statute that made it a criminal
offense for a person to be addicted to the use of narcotics. The
trial court had instructed the jury that the appellant could be
convicted upon a finding of his "status" or "chronic condition"
as "addicted to the use of narcotics."5 In the Supreme Court's
analysis, the statute punished a person not for the use of nar-
cotics, nor for selling, buying or possession of narcotics in Cali-
fornia, but for being an addict - for status or condition
without proof of a common law actus reus. The Robinson Court
struck the statute as cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.
But although the Robinson decision may appear to be
enlightened, the Court hastened to add, lest it be thought soft
on drugs, "[W]e are not unmindful that the vicious evils of the
narcotics traffic have occasioned the grave concern of the gov-
ernment."'" The "evils" were apparently too obvious to spec-
ify. In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas did not shy away
from offering a fantastic bill of particulars on the evils of
heroin:
"To be a confirmed drug addict is to be one of the walk-
ing dead .... The teeth have rotted out; the appetite is
lost and the stomach and intestines don't function prop-
erly. The gall bladder becomes inflamed; eyes and skin
turn a bilious yellow. In some cases membranes of the
nose turn a flaming red; the partition separating the nos-
trils is eaten away - breathing is difficult. Oxygen in the
48. A. TREBACH, supra note 35, at 92.
49. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
50. Id. at 662.
51. Id. at 667.
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blood decreases; bronchitis and tuberculosis develop.
Good traits of character disappear and bad ones emerge.
Sex organs become affected. Veins collapse and livid
purplish scars remain. Boils and abscesses plague the
skin; gnawing pain racks the body. Nerves snap; vicious
twitching develops. Imaginary and fantastic fears blight
the mind and sometimes complete insanity results. Often
times, too, death comes - much too early in life ...
Such is the plague of being one of the walking dead."52
Justice Douglas was known for his rebellious streak and his
sense of humor, and the purple passage quoted above may
have been intended as a parody. If taken literally, it is absurd,
the print equivalent of the 1989 TV commercial showing a fry-
ing egg as "your brain on drugs." Even if there were a clinical
case to exemplify the foregoing description, it would bear the
same relationship to a typical heroin user as a sterno-drinking
skid row bum bears to a typical social drinker.
Douglas' opinion is perhaps unique insofar as it exculpates
rather than condemns the drug user. Still, his absurdly livid
and inaccurate account of heroin addiction hardly qualifies as
an exemplar of lawyer-like fact-finding and analysis. Where are
his sources? He cites only an article in a legal newspaper, com-
pletely ignoring the extensive body of studies about heroin
addiction that had been produced in the United States and
Britain. In fact, Douglas had available to him not only the Rol-
leston Report, but also the first Brain Report, which had been
commissioned to review the Rolleston recommendations.
Brain I specifically endorsed the recommendations of the
Rolleston Committee on addiction maintenance. The Commit-
tee confirmed the existence of "stabilized addicts" based upon
"careful scrutiny of the histories of more than a hundred per-
sons classified as addicts." The Brain Committee concluded
that "many of them who have been taking small and regular
doses for years show little evidence of tolerance and are often
leading reasonably satisfactory lives." 53 This should not sur-
prise those knowledgeable about the physiological effects of
heroin: "putting aside the problem of addiction, the chemical
heroin seems almost a neutral or benign substance. Taken in
stable, moderate doses, it does not seem to cause organic
injury, as does alcoholism over time." Longevity and good
52. Id. at 672 (quoting N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1960 at 4, col. 2).
53. A. TREBACH, supra note 35, at 104.
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overall health are not uncommon in addicts with access to ster-
ile needles and uncontaminated heroin.54
Justice Douglas did not have the benefit of the Zinberg and
Trebach books when he wrote Robinson; he did have access to
Rolleston, Brain I, the Joint Committee of the American Bar
Association and the American Medical Association on Narcotic
Drugs, Drug Addiction: Crime or Disease? Interim and Final
Reports, 1961. Also, an extensive body of research in medical
journals was available to refute the ridiculous "walking dead"
metaphor. The Justice apparently did not want hard data and
informed policy analysis; instead he replaced analysis with
metaphor, which better suited his goal. The nature of the non-
medical source he cited, the New York Law Journal, a legal
newspaper, indicates that he searched for the most grotesque
account he could find. Douglas was able to succeed in this
gross distortion of reality on the relatively safe assumption that
no one would challenge it. After all, it was an "established
fact" that narcotics are "worse than poisons." Given that social
reality, there was no need forJustice Douglas to quote from the
extensive literature of heroin addiction and treatment.
The extremism of the "walking dead" and the "worse-
than-poisons" rhetoric is brought into sharper relief by com-
parison with the rarely encountered analytical and temperate
approach of the court of appeals in United States v. Moore.55 The
court there rejected the defendant's argument that his drug
addiction was a defense to drug possession charges, observing
that before becoming addicted, a person's heroin use is a
"freely willed illegal act."56 After becoming addicted, an addict
cannot demand exculpation on the ground that he cannot stop
his drug taking because he "retains some ability to extricate
himself from his addiction by ceasing to take drugs," depend-
ing upon his "strength of character."57
The metaphysics of free will to one side, the court's insis-
tence in Moore on the legal responsibility of the addict is consis-
tent with the premise of rehabilitation: the addict must take
54. A. TREBACH, supra note 35, at 60. Norman Zinberg's research in
DRUG, SET AND SETrING (1984) confirms, in the United States, that a great
many heroin users have developed stable, non-addictive patterns of
occasional use or "chipping," over long periods of time. Many users and
even addicts are employed and have stable family relationships. Compare J.
KAPLAN, THE HARDEST DRUG: HEROIN AND PUBLIC POLICY (1983), for an
argument against legalization or even addiction maintenance.
55. 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
56. Id. at 1145.
57. Id. at 1151.
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responsibility for becoming and staying drug free. That it has a
basis in reality is demonstrated by the fact that there are mil-
lions offormer addicts - not only of heroin but of the similarly
addictive drug nicotine5" - who have mustered up the neces-
sary self control. This is a far distance from being one of the
"walking dead" or a "moral pervert."
The concurring opinion in Moore by Judge Leventhal is one
of the best informed and most intelligent opinions on drug pol-
icy ever published by a judge, speaking in a nuanced way of the
respective roles of law enforcement and medicine in respond-
ing to drug addiction. There are yet other concurring opinions
in this unique case.5" None of them necessarily captures the
elusive truth(s) about drugs and drug addiction. All of the
opinions command respect as judicious and judicial. Several
opinions canvass and consult the Prettyman Commission, the
National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, and
many other authorities on drug issues. This intelligence at
work is a far cry from the rantings of the "walking dead" or
"worse than poisons" language that in general dominates judi-
cial discussions of drug issues in the cases. Unfortunately,
there are few other examples of critical thought by federal
judges on the drug issue.
Turner v. United States,6" introduced a new, more modern
theme into the Supreme Court's cases on drugs - the "evils of
drug trafficking" confused with and misstated as the "evils of
drugs." In this domain, the Court failed to recognize the
destructive power of drug money, as distinguished from the
drugs themselves. Turner was charged inter alia with two
counts of receiving and transporting illegally imported heroin
and cocaine. The Supreme Court reviewed the case with
respect to the validity of the statutory presumption that the
drugs in question were illegally imported, as charged in two
counts of the indictment.
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, dissented vigor-
ously from the portion of the opinion upholding Turner's con-
victions on the other counts. The strongly worded dissent
attacked the majority, listing eight separate respects in which
58. REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF
SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION (1988).
59. In dissent, Judge Wright tilted toward the drug-taker-as-victim
approach of Justice Douglas: "The confirmed addict is in fact a worried,
troubled, harried individual. Misery, alienation and despair, rather than
pleasure and ecstasy, are the key features of his existence." 486 F.2d at 1234.
His opinion is marked by compassion rather than condemnation.
60. 396 U.S. 398 (1969).
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the decision operates "to undercut and destroy" the constitu-
tional rights of the accused. 61 However, the dissenters ironi-
cally provided a rationale for the very crackdown they
denounced by assuming, without citation or analysis, that
"drugs are bad":
Commercial traffic in deadly mind-soul-and-body-
destroying drugs is beyond a doubt one of the greatest
evils of our time. It cripples intellects, dwarfs bodies,
paralyzes the progress of a substantial segment of our
society, and frequently makes hopeless and sometimes
violent and murderous criminals of persons of all ages
who become its victims. Such consequences call for the
most vigorous laws to suppress the traffic as well as the
most powerful efforts to put these vigorous laws into
effect. Unfortunately, the grave evils such as the narcotics traffic
can too easily cause threats to our basic liberties by making attrac-
tive the adoption of constitutionally forbidden short-cuts that
might suppress and blot out more quickly the unpopular and dan-
gerous conduct. 62
Active verbs in Justice Black's opinion in Turner - "cripples,"
"dwarfs," "paralyzes," "makes" - smack of factuality. The
Justice does not trouble to cite any authority for those claims.
Rather, he returns to the theme that "drugs are bad," and
relies on what the public "knows" and fears about drugs. This
is bad medicine and bad law.
The Justice does not trouble to identify the drugs con-
demned as mind-body-and-soul destroyers in the opinion.
Cocaine is in some respects more toxic than heroin, having a
narrower range of variation between an effective dose and a
lethal dose.6" Although classified by Title 21 as a Schedule II
narcotic - having a high potential for abuse and an accepted
use in medical practice in the United States - it is actually a
stimulant of the central nervous system similar in its action to
amphetamines. It has a legitimate medical use as a topical
anesthetic in ear, nose and throat surgery. In 1985, 1,223 peo-
ple died from illicit cocaine use as reported by Medical Examin-
ers from most major cities (excluding New York); an additional
20,383 persons visited hospital emergency rooms in distress
from cocaine.' These casualties must be assessed in the con-
61. Id. at 425.
62. Id. at 426 (emphasis supplied).
63. See L. GRINSPOON &J. BAKALAR, COCAINE: A DRUG AND ITS SOCIAL
EVOLUTION (1976).
64. NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMMITrEE
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text of the consumption by 12.2 million people who reported
using cocaine that year.65 The fear of cocaine looms larger
than its actual threat to life and limb, primarily because celeb-
rity overdose deaths such as those of John Belushi, David Ken-
nedy, and Len Bias, proved to be so dramatic and shocking.
Justice Black's claims in Turner about cocaine were not true
then and remain untrue today even though there is significantly
more mortality. Therefore, it is false to say that cocaine in gen-
eral "cripples intellects" and "dwarfs bodies" as stated in Tur-
ner. Longer-term physical and mental problems occur, often
dramatically, but in unknown proportion to the total popula-
tion of users.6 6 Clearly, Justice Black was not concerned with
empiricism but was engaged in a metaphorical exercise in
asserting that drugs cripple minds, dwarf bodies or turn people
into "violent and murderous criminals." The use of the
anthropomorphic "they" in speaking of drugs is especially
revealing: it attributes to "drugs" control over the individual.
That conclusion quite falsely assumes that there is a predictable
behavioral as opposed to physical effect from the taking of a
drug.67 Medicine can reliably predict that a person who ingests
cocaine will experience an elevated heart rate and other physio-
logical changes; no one can predict whether that person will do
anything as a result of the drug.
Justice Black's claims not only lack any basis in evidence,
they also defy common sense and experience. "Common
REPORT 9 (1989). The comparable figures for 1988 were 2,334 deaths out of
some 8.2 million people who had used it that year, and 42,383 hospital
emergency room visits.
65. The National Institute for Drug Abuse, National Household Survey
(1985) data also reported 5.8 million having used cocaine in the 30 days
preceding the household survey and 22 million with lifetime experience with
the drug. The reliability of such self-reporting measures is called into serious
question by NIDA's 1988 National Household Survey. In 1988, reported
lifetime experience had declined to 21.2 million; did the other 800,000 all die
in three years, or simply deny their criminality in the face of increasing public
hostility and punitive laws?
A second doubt arises from the fact that the thirty-day use figure
declined by half to 2.9 million, and the annual use figure to 8.2 million.
Despite these large reported drops in the number of users, the mortality rose
to 2,234 and the hospital emergency room visits rose to 42,512. It is possible
that many fewer users were hard-core addicts, especially crack smokers,
running much higher risks of overdose and death. Skepticism is warranted,
however.
66. The author estimates that the addiction potential for cocaine is
about the same for alcohol-about 20% of the population of consumers.
BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS, supra note 1, at 17-30.
67. Id. at 17-18.
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knowledge" of drinking suggests that alcohol affects people in
many different ways. Alcohol "makes" some people aggressive
and violent, some cheerful and gregarious, some passive and
drowsy, and some simply sick and non-functional. So, too, can
cocaine or any other drug affecting the central nervous system
vary in its effects. Further, the incidence and prevalence of
harms to the user are fundamentally distinct from the "violent
and murderous" trade that seeks to reap the risk premium
offered by black market sales. But this distinction is never
acknowledged by the dissenters in Turner; who simply assert
that the drug traffic is "one of the greatest evils of our time. '"68
If this is true, it is the result of the black market crime tariff
and not the psycho-pharmacological properties of drugs
themselves.
The same confusion of drug and drug traffic appeared
again in United States v. Mendenhall,69 one of a series of cases to
reach the Court arising from the use of the airport courier pro-
file.7" Mendenhall was stopped and questioned during a search
and was told that she had a right to refuse to be searched.
Because she consented, the Court held that the two bags con-
taining heroin that were found on her person did not constitute
a Fourth Amendment violation.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Blackmun, once again shows the power of
the single, simple yet compelling idea that "drugs are bad":
The public has a compelling interest in detecting those
who would traffic in deadly drugs for personal profit.
Few problems affecting the health and welfare of our
population, particularly our young, cause greater con-
cern than the escalating use of controlled substances.
Much of the drug traffic is highly organized by sophisti-
68. A similar assumption about the relation between drugs and
violence appears in United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
where the court upheld the constitutional validity of a statute doubling the
punishment for drug distribution within one thousand feet of a public or
private elementary or secondary school. In moderate language, the court
held that the statute was "rationally structured" to effectuate its purpose of
"threatening pushers who approach our children near school with stiff
penalties." Id. at 1219. The court did assume, however, without record
support or citation, that such transactions "contribute directly to the violent
and dangerous criminal milieu Congress sought to eliminate in the proximity
of schools." Id. at 1219.
69. 446 U.S. 544 (1979).
70. See also Florida v. Royer, 448 U.S. 438 (1980); United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
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cated criminal syndicates. The profits are enor-
mous ....
Like Justice Black in Turner, Justice Powell assumes the worst
about the psychopharmacology of drugs, without troubling to
check his opinion against medical or pharmacological authori-
ties. He repeatedly used the word "deadly," for example. But
as applied to marijuana, this clearly is wrong. Not a single
death from the pharmacological action of marijuana has ever
been confirmed.
DEA Chief Administrative LawJudge Frances Young ruled
in 1988 that marijuana is "far safer than many foods we com-
monly consume" and that its medical benefits are "clear
beyond any question."-72 Marijuana's therapeutic applications
include the relief of intra-ocular pressure in glaucoma sufferers
and the nausea often suffered by chemotherapy patients. Yet
marijuana has an outlaw legal status; it is listed along with her-
oin as a Schedule I drug and is thus completely outlawed in
medical practice in the United States, except for experimental
and research purposes.
The beating of the tom-toms of the "War on Drugs," espe-
cially the war against cocaine, has caused a kind of national
amnesia about marijuana. As recently as 1972, the National
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse recommended that
private "possession of marihuana for personal use should no
longer be an offense" and that "distribution in private of small
amounts of marijuana for no remuneration or insignificant
remuneration not involving a profit would no longer be an
offense."-7 3 Similar, sometimes broader, proposals to relax the
drug laws came from the American Medical Association, the
American Bar Association, the Consumers' Union, the National
Education Association, the National Council of Churches, the
American Public Health Association, the National Advisory
Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals and
others. 74 As late as 1977, President Carter declared himself in
favor of decriminalization of marijuana.
71. 446 U.S. at 561.
72. In the Matter of Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, Dkt. No. 86-22,
Dept. ofJustice, DEA, Sept. 6, 1988.
73. FIRST REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA AND
DRUG ABUSE, MARIJUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING 154 (1972). The
Commission also recommended that possession in public of one ounce or
less of marijuana would no longer be an offense, although the drug would be
"contraband subject to summary seizure and forfeiture." Id.
74. A partial list of these "decriminalizing" organizations appears in
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMISSION ON BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL
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A decade later, the National Academy of Sciences reviewed
the findings and recommendation of the National Commission
on Marijuana and Drug Abuse. It found no "conclusive evi-
dence" of major, long-term public health problems caused by
marijuana, only "worrisome possibilities." On the question of
legal control, it basically endorsed the position of the 1972
National Commission: "On balance ... we believe that a policy
of partial prohibition is clearly preferable to a policy of com-
plete prohibition of supply and use."' 75 This scientific and
informed view contrasts markedly with the political and unin-
formed point of view embodied in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988, which states that "Congress . . . believes marijuana is a
serious evil in American society and a serious threat to its
people." 76
In light of these recommendations, we cannot assume that
Justice Powell meant "drugs" to refer to marijuana. He might
have been referring to cocaine, a far more toxic drug and one
that can be (although is not ordinarily) deadly; but Mendenhall
was arrested for heroin trafficking. Assuming that Justice Pow-
ell meant to refer only to heroin, the drug involved in the case,
his use of the word "deadly" is either intended metaphorically
or is irresponsibly misleading. Even though heroin has a lethal
potential, heroin has benign or therapeutic purposes for the
relief of pain, was at one time accepted in medical practice in
the United States and Europe, and can be taken by citizens
leading "satisfactory lives," as found by the Brain Committee.
Heroin is unlike a deadly weapon, for example, one designed
SCIENCES AND EDUCATION, COMMITTEE ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND HABITUAL
BEHAVIOR, AN ANALYSIS OF MARIJUANA POLICY (1982) [hereinafter NRC
COMMISSION].
75. Id. at 29.
76. The National Academy focused its concern on the very young:
"heavy use by anyone or any use by growing children should be discouraged.
Although conclusive evidence is lacking of major, long-term public health
problems caused by marijuana, they are worrisome possibilities, and both the
reports and a priori likelihood of developmental damage to some young
users makes marijuana use a cause for extreme concern." Id. Compare United
States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 513 (1st Cir. 1984):
The question whether the government has an overriding
interest in controlling the use and distribution of marijuana by
private citizens is a topic of continuing political controversy. Much
evidence has been adduced from which it might rationally be
inferred that marijuana constitutes a health hazard and a threat to
social welfare; on the other hand, proponents of free marijuana use
have attempted to demonstrate that it is quite harmless. See also
Randall v. Wyrick, 441 F. Supp. 312, 315-16 (W.D. Mo. 1977);
United States v. Kuch, 288 F. Supp. 439, 446, 448 (D.D.C. 1968).
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to inflict death or great bodily harm, such as a gun or a knife.
To call it deadly is thus a rhetorical flourish. Although over-
dose death can occur, that is not heroin's intended function.
Moreover, the risk attending the use of heroin, medically
supervised, is very small. Without medical supervision, the risk
rises with contaminated needles, adulterated heroin, and igno-
rance of important purity and dose control information, for
example. Even so, the annual death toll from heroin overdose
is very low in relation to the millions of doses consumed:
roughly 1,000 deaths per year in the DAWN reporting sys-
tem,7 7 out of an estimated heroin using population of 1-2 mil-
lion dosing itself with varying frequencies. 78 All of these facts
were readily available to Justice Powell. Neither he nor his law
clerks troubled to do the research. After all, isn't it a matter of
common knowledge?
Perhaps even more fundamentally wrong is Justice Pow-
ell's confusion of two entirely distinct issues: the harms that
may arise from "the escalating use of controlled substances"
and the harms that may arise from the traffic that is "highly
organized by sophisticated criminal syndicates" reaping enor-
mous profits. The first is a problem of drugs. The second is a
problem of drug money. Many courts have confused the two
issues as Justice Powell did, falsely attributing the demonstra-
ble evils of violent black marketeering to the drugs themselves.
A case in point is Carmona v. Ward,7 9 where the court con-
sidered the argument that mandatory life sentences meted out
under New York's "Rockefeller" drug laws constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment. In reviewing a conviction on habeas corpus, the court of
appeals applied a tripartite proportionality test which consid-
ered the gravity of the offense, a comparison of the punish-
ments for other crimes in New York, and a comparison of the
77. DAWN is the acronym for Drug Abuse Warning system, a
compilation of information from medical examiners and hospital emergency
rooms in most Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas. The combined figure
for morphine/heroin deaths for the first nine months of 1987 was 918,
excluding New York City. National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers
Committee, The NNICC Report 1987 (1988).
78. National Institute of Drug Abuse, National Household Survey 29
(1985).
79. 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978). Carmona was convicted of two counts
of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, an A-I felony with a
mandatory minimum 15-year sentence. She plead to second degree felony
and was sentenced to six years to life. Defendant Fowler was charged with an
A-III felony, a four years to life sentence, after selling twenty dollars worth of
cocaine to an undercover agent.
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challenged penalty to those for the same offense in other
jurisdictions.
In weighing the gravity of the offense, the court rejected
the argument that petitioners' drug sales should be viewed,
standing alone, as isolated, relatively minor events. Instead,
the court assessed them as "symptoms of the widespread and
pernicious phenomenon of drug distribution. "80 The court
then listed the social harms arising from drug trafficking:
1. Narcotic addicts turn to crime - such as prostitution,
drug sales and property crimes to feed their habits [a function
of inflated black market prices].
2. Drug addiction degrades and impoverishes those
whom it enslaves [impoverishment is a function of inflated
black market prices].
3. Addicts often commit acts of violence against police
officers and other addicts because of the high stakes [a function
of the large amounts of money].
4. The profits are so lucrative that police become cor-
rupted [again, the issue is one of money].
The court concluded:
Measured thus by the harm it inflicts upon the addict,
and through him, upon society as a whole, drug dealing
in its present epidemic proportions is a grave offense of
high rank.8
While this line of argument is obviously far more sophisti-
cated than the rhetoric of "moral perverts" or "worse than poi-
sons," it is still not a serious job of analysis. For even if the
social harms listed by the court are accepted as true, the argu-
ment evades the question of the gravity of the drug offense per
se, as compared to the effects of prohibition. The court's lit-
any of social harms arising from drug trafficking unwittingly
makes the case for deregulation of the drug markets. The four
points - apart from the moral degradation argument, which is
contradicted by the "strength of character" premise of the
Moore case - would not exist but for the black market set up by
the legal prohibitions on drug transactions. Indeed, the pre-
cise claims made by the court to justify the severity of punish-
ment would have applied to the sale of alcohol during National
Prohibition, which greatly enriched bootleggers and empow-
ered organized crime. Such claims would also apply if the sale
of cigarettes - a drug as addictive as cocaine or heroin,
80. Id. at 411.
81. Id.
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according to former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop8 2 _
were to be outlawed, throwing some 52,000,000 nicotine
addicts into craving and withdrawal symptoms. The Carmona
court would conclude that the illegal sale of a familiar and once
socially acceptable drug constitutes "a grave offense of high
rank."
Is this line of economic and historical analysis too much to
expect of a court engaged in a serious job of constitutional
analysis? Relevant information was easily accessible to the
court when it wrote. In response to President Nixon's declara-
tion of war on drugs in 1972, for example, economist Milton
Friedman had written about the drugs/crime connection years
before Carmona reached the court of appeals in 1978. Fried-
man wrote that:
Prohibition is an attempted cure that makes matters
worse-for the addict and the rest of us. ... [T]he indi-
vidual addict would clearly be far better off if drugs were
legal. Addicts are driven to associate with criminals to
get the drugs, become criminals themselves to finance
the habit, and risk constant danger of death and disease.
Consider next the rest of us. The harm to us from the
addiction of others arises almost wholly from the fact that
drugs are illegal. It is estimated that addicts commit one
third to one half of all street crime in the U.S.
Legalize drugs, and street crime would drop dramatically.
In a 1989 letter to drug czar Bennett, Freidman wrote that
"[diecriminalizing drugs is even more urgent now. Our experi-
ence with the prohibition of drugs is a replay of our experience
with the prohibition of alcoholic beverages.'83
One might question whether a court could appropriately
consider the severity of the offense absent black market effects
on the assumption that the New York law violated the laws of
supply and demand. But irrationality is the core concept of a
substantive due process attack such as the Eighth Amend-
ment's proportionality test as applied by Carmona. Judge
Oakes, in his dissent, did question the wisdom of the law by
citing a report that concluded "the operation of the 1973 New
York drug law has had no real deterrent effect on drug abuse or
on resulting felonious property crimes." 4 He made the fur-
82. REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 58.
83. Both references are incorporated in An Open Letter to Bill Bennett,
Wall St.J., Sept. 29, 1989, § 1, at 15, col. 2.
84. 576 F.2d at 447.
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ther point that the Governor had appointed a revision commit-
tee to reconsider the mandatory sentences.
But even if the law had to be taken as a given, it was unfair
to lay the effects of the massive black market in drugs at the
petitioner's door on the grounds that he was a cog in a much
larger machine: "New York's drug problem is a socioeconomic
phenomenon or set of phenomena attributable to a great many
factors with which the appellees have had nothing whatsoever
to do." 8
5
When Carmona reached the Supreme Court, Justice Mar-
shall, joined by Justice Powell dissented from the denial of cer-
tiorari on the ground that the mandatory penalties of the
Rockefeller law were disproportionately severe.
To rationalize petitioner's sentences by invoking all evils
attendant on or attributable to widespread drug traffick-
ing is simply not compatible with a fundamental premise
of the criminal justice system, that individuals are
accountable only for their own criminal acts.86
To justify a stringent penalty for an act on the assump-
tion that the act may engender other crimes makes little
sense when those other crimes carry less severe sanctions
than the act itself. [citation omitted] In sum, by focusing
on the corrosive social impact of drug trafficking in gen-
eral, rather than on petitioners actual-and clearly margi-
nal-involvement in that enterprise, the Court of Appeals
substantially overstated the gravity of the instant
charge.87
That same error was committed by the Fifth Circuit in Ter-
rebone v. Blackburn,88 where the defendant was convicted of dis-
tributing 22 packets of heroin to undercover narcotics agents.
After receiving a mandatory life sentence under Louisiana law,
Terrebone sought a federal writ of habeas corpus on the Eighth
Amendment grounds raised in Carmona, and argued that a
mandatory life sentence imposed upon an addict constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. Following the same analysis as
the Carmona court, the Fifth Circuit rejected the challenge in
vivid metaphors:
It is quite true that the trade in drugs is an ugly enterprise
which preys upon both the physical and psychological
weaknesses of man, and that this enormous danger to
85. Id. at 422.
86. 439 U.S. 1091, 1096 (1979).
87. Id. at 1097.
88. 624 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1980).
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society may justify severe sanctions in many or most dis-
tribution cases.
It is a matter of common knowledge and it is a fact, that
social conditions in this state are adversely affected by the
pervading traffic in and use of drugs. This condition is a
serious menace to good social order ....
It is no defense to this prosecution that distribution
of drugs is not a violent crime and consequently punish-
ment for this offense should not be on a par with second
degree murder and aggravated kidnapping. Assuming
the punishments are equal, traffic in narcotics is an insidi-
ous crime which, although not necessarily violent, is surely
as grave. Indeed, the effect upon society of drug traffic is
pernicious and far reaching. For each transaction in drugs
breeds another and in the case of heroin the degeneracy of
the victim is virtually irreversible. Compared to the effect of
drug traffic in society isolated violent crimes may well be
considered the lesser of the two evils.89
Following a second en banc consideration, the Fifth Circuit
re-asserted its view that heroin dealing, even in small retail
amounts, should be ranked for Eighth Amendment purposes as
equal to or worse than violent crimes such as aggravated kid-
napping or aggravated arson:
Except in rare cases, the murderer's red hand falls on one
victim only, however grim the blow; but the foul hand of
the drug dealer blights life after life and, like the vampire
of fable, creates others in its owner's evil image - others
who create others still, across our land and down our
generations, sparing not even the unborn.90
Grotesque and damning imagery ("foul hand" and "vampire")
again masquerade as analysis and conceal completely the con-
sensual nature of drug transactions. The responsibility of the
user, or even an addict, is disregarded; it is the "drug dealing
vampire" that "blights" the lives of others and "creates" more
vampires, who bear no responsibility for their conduct. They
are portrayed as victims, pure and simple. The distinction is
crucial for policy purposes. Whereas consumers are entitled to
89. Id. at 1369 (emphasis supplied).
90. Terrebone v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500, 504 (5th Cir. 1988). The
vampire language was quoted by the court in Young v. Miller, 883 F.2d 1276,
1283 (6th Cir. 1989), upholding mandatory life without parole upon a first
offender under Michigan law, which punished petitioner's offense the same as
first degree murder. The defendant was a 25-year-old mother of a small
child.
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freedom in the marketplace, victims are entitled to legal protec-
tion from their victimizers.
The court upheld "the most severe penalty for heroin
dealing" among the 50 States largely because of the majority's
view that Terrebone "was caught contributing to what seems
generally agreed to be our country's major domestic problem:
the sale and use of hard drugs."'" The court did not cite any
authority to justify its ipse dixit; is it really so obvious that drug
trafficking is more serious than homelessness, the impoverish-
ment of children, or the apparent decline of the public schools?
The drug problem is simply assumed to be the "major domes-
tic problem."
Assumptions like those are part of a vicious circle.
Cocaine floods into the country despite vigorous law enforce-
ment and interdiction. The social pathologies of the black mar-
ket grow worse and worse. Then it is a short step to the public
frustration, outrage and "call to arms" as expressed in United
States v. Miranda,9" where the defendant was convicted of con-
spiracy to import and importing 23 tons of marijuana and
sought release on bond pending appeal. The court analyzed
nine criteria specified by the statute then governing bail pend-
ing appeal, determined that defendant was a danger to the
community, and denied bond pending appeal. Having decided
the dispositive questions adversely to the defendant, the court
did not rest but added an extended commentary, following the
Carmona and Terrebone "thinking":
Drug trafficking represents a serious threat to the
general welfare of this community. Drug importation
and its eventual sale is directly involved in the further-
ance of drug dependence and is conducive to the
proliferation of crimes related thereto. National statistics
on armed robbery, assault and murder have increased
tremendously as narcotics addicts have sought ways to
obtain funds to feed their habits.
The community must be protected from violations of
the law which prey on the weak of mankind. A wholesale
drug peddler, such as the defendant, exploits this weak-
ness and, in doing so, certainly poses a danger to the wel-
fare of the community.
If narcotics traffic is a social and health hazard, then
every narcotics dealer is a danger to society.
91. Id. at 505.
92. 442 F. Supp. 786 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
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The call to arms, simply stated, it is time for the
merchants of misery, destruction and death to be put out
of business. The hideous evil wrought by these criminals
through their unlawful importation and distribution of
narcotics and controlled substances is unforgivable.
Engulfed by their greed, these individuals have shown no
concern for the thousands of lives that they have ruined
and the unimaginable sorrow that they have heaped upon
the people of this community, this state and this nation.9"
In the years following Miranda's call to arms, the United
States escalated the current War on Drugs to unprecedented
levels. Albernaz' "turning the screw" of the criminal justice sys-
tem in drug enforcement now includes, inter alia, pretrial deten-
tion, mandatory and severe sentences, expanded search and
seizure powers - helicopter overflights, sniffing of luggage by
drug detector dogs, electronic surveillance of vehicles by con-
cealed radio-tracking devices, warrantless searches of motor-
home residences, public school students' purses, ships in the
inland waterways connected to the sea, etc. - mandatory
urinalysis, "zero tolerance" forfeitures of cars, planes and
boats, the assessment of "civil fines" up to $10,000 and termi-
nation of government benefits for simple possession of per-
sonal use amounts.94 Yet the drug trade flourishes, openly and
notoriously, in outdoor drug markets.
The zeal born of frustration and outrage sometimes bor-
ders on vindictiveness, as reflected in anti-drug proposals that
have thus far failed to become law: the Arctic Gulag proposal
for convicted drug offenders;9 5 the House Republican Task
Force bill calling for confiscation of 25% of the adjusted gross
income and net assets of anyone caught possessing illegal sub-
stances; 96 the proposal to shoot down civilian aircraft entering
the United States without having filed a flight plan; the boot
camp for drug users proposed by Secretary Bennett or his
acquiescence in the beheading of drug dealers; and many
others of this genre. On occasion, the outrage spills over into
prejudice against those racially or ethnically associated in pub-
lic stereotype with the drug traffic.97
93. Id. at 792.
94. Crackdown, supra note 6, at 907.
95. H.R. 7112, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., § 2,128 Cong. Rec. 7088 (1982).
96. THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT REPORT 2 (June 23, 1988).
97. A district judge remarked that Colombians had little regard for
judges, having killed 32 of them. United States v. Edwardo-Franco, 885 F.2d
1002, 1005 (2d Cir. 1989).
The Florida Highway Patrol drug courier profile alerts troopers to watch
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DRUGS IN POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE
The foregoing examples demonstrate the strong emo-
tional, non-rational attitudes surrounding the drug issue. The
cycle of crackdown, escalation, failure and repression perpetu-
ates itself. Judges and other policy makers do not seem to be
aware that their decisions and actions arise out of preconcep-
tions or presupposition rather than factual inquiry and rea-
soned study.
If these ideas are false, or at least unproved, why do they
persist so strongly? They are deeply rooted in the public con-
sciousness. Consider Musto's account:
By 1900, America had developed a comparatively
large addict population, perhaps 250,000, along with a
fear of addiction and addicting drugs. This fear had cer-
tain elements which have been powerful enough to per-
mit the most profoundly punitive methods to be
employed in the fight against addicts and suppliers ....
In the nineteenth century addicts were identified
with foreign groups and internal minorities who were
already actively feared and the objects of elaborate and
massive social and legal restraints. Two repressed
groups which were associated with the use of certain
drugs were the Chinese and the Negroes. The Chinese
and their custom of opium smoking were closely watched
after their entry into the United States about 1870. At
first, the Chinese represented only one more group
brought in to help build railroads, but, particularly after
economic depression made them a labor surplus and a
threat to American citizens, many forms of antagonism
arose to drive them out or at least to isolate them. Along
with this prejudice came a fear of opium smoking as one
of the ways in which the Chinese were supposed to
undermine American society.
Cocaine was especially feared in the South by 1900
because of its euphoric and stimulating properties. The
South feared that Negro cocaine users might become
oblivious of their prescribed bounds and attack white
society.98
Drug control provided a point of convergence for Progres-
sive reformers, moral crusaders, political entrepreneurs and
for "ethnic groups associated with the drug trade." Pollack, Troopers Aiming at
Flow on Turnpike, Ft Lauderdale News, Aug. 6, 1984, at B9.
98. See D. Musto, supra note 32, at 5-7.
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those who were simply ignorant, fearful, and prejudiced.
Under federal control, the non-rational elements soon drove
out the rational; by the mid-1920s, the police model of drug
control had almost completely displaced the medical model.
Policing drugs not only required a drug abuse establishment, it
also invited political exploitation of the drug issue, a legacy
from which the United States has never recovered.
I Edward Jay Epstein begins his account of political manipu-
lation of federal drug control with Harry Anslinger. Before
asking Congress for funds to expand the Bureau, he published
an article entitled "Marijuana: Assassin of Youth," in which he
warned of an epidemic of violent crimes committed by young
people under the influence of marijuana. Unlike opium, which,
he told Congress, could be good or bad, marijuana was
"entirely the monster [Mr.] Hyde." In short, those who
smoked it would go insane or turn violent or both. Congress
responded, and over the opposition of the American Medical
Association enacted the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, empower-
ing the federal government to police the marijuana supply.
Federal suppression of marijuana was thus based on a false
premise.
During World War II, according to Epstein's account,
Anslinger waged a press campaign to convince the American
public of the baseless charge that Japan was systematically
attempting to addict its enemies, including the American peo-
ple, to opium, in order to destroy their civilization. During the
Korean War, Anslinger used a similar ploy. He leaked a report
to the press claiming that "subversion through drug addiction
is an established aim of communist China," and that the Com-
munist Chinese were smuggling massive amounts of heroin
into the United States to "weaken American resistance." Later
politicians such as Senator Paula Hawkins (R. Fla.) made essen-
tially the same claims about Cuba in 1984, i.e., that the Govern-
ment of Cuba, as a matter of policy, was flooding the United
States with cocaine in order to subvert our society by ruining
our youth. New York Governor Hugh Carey had done essen-
tially the same thing regarding a 1980 wave of jewelry snatch-
ing on subways and commuter trains: "The epidemic of gold-
snatching in the city is the result of a Russian design to wreck
America by flooding the nation with deadly heroin."99 Of
course, he presented no evidence in support of this claim.
Epstein's account of the politics of drugs extends to Presi-
dential politics. He makes the point that Richard Nixon built
99. E.J. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 33.
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his 1968 "law and order" campaign on public fear of street
crime after realizing that "the menace of communism on which
he built his early reputation no longer was an effective focus for
organizing the fears of the American public."'' ° Epstein's
interpretation, if correct, is even more persuasive in the 1980s,
as Presidents Reagan and Bush have presided over the appar-
ent end of the Cold War.'' These historical and political per-
spectives show that much of the conventional wisdom about
drugs is rooted in decades of disinformation and manipulative
rhetoric. Consider how the dark, sinister imagery must have
played a decisive role in shaping contemporary public con-
sciousness about drugs: "assassin of youth," "subversion,"
"Communist China," "Russian design," "national emergency,"
"public enemy number one." This is powerful stuff, if one
accepts that the words and ideas have power.
In fact, the "killer weed" fears frightened Congress in
1937 into passing the Marihuana Tax Act and the "cocaine-
crazed Negroes" frightened police departments in the pre-
Depression South to trade up to .38 caliber handguns.'0 2 Dur-
ing virtually all of the twentieth century, with the possible
exception of a brief glasnost during the 1970s, these false
images of drugs have reigned unchallenged. Anslinger's bogus
claims about marijuana set an enduring tone and mood.
Thirty-five years later, more or less, Pennsylvania Governor
Raymond Shafer, Chairman (ironically) of the President's Com-
mission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse, held a press conference
at which he announced-falsely-that a youth had taken LSD
and stared at the sun until he became blind. He later admitted
his scare tactic, justifying it by a desire to save people from
what he was convinced was a real danger, although he had no
medical evidence to support his preconception. No wonder
judges have for the most part accepted what nearly every one
"knows" to be the truth about drugs. Misinformation is the
norm.
FRESH PERSPECTIVES ON DRUGS
Fresh perspectives on drugs may be impossible for society
as a whole. Seven decades of relentless anti-drug propaganda
have deprived the public of its power of critical thinking on this
subject. The Government, more than ever, is committed to a
war on drugs almost as a categorical imperative, irrespective of
100. Szasz, The War Against Drugs, 12 J. DRUG ISSUES 115 (1982).
101. E.J. EPSTEIN, supra note 9, at 59.
102. D. MUSTO, supra note 32, at 28.
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whether it produces positive results. Doubting politicians are
for the most part cowed into silent submission by a McCarthy-
ite anti-drug witch hunt. Ironically, like the stopped clock that
comes right twice a day, the emergence of crack-cocaine in the
summer of 1986 finally conferred some plausibility upon the
most outrageous claims about drugs that drug enforcement
bureaucrats and allied politicians have always made. The very
worst, most sensational scenarios of crack addiction seem to
resemble the "walking dead" and "worse than poisons" meta-
phors so promiscuously used in the past, before crack was
invented. The more meaningful fact - that we do not know
the ratio of crack "victims" to the total population of crack
users - carries no clout. One known victim is worth a thou-
sand words of analysis, and maybe even a thousand points of
light.
For these reasons, the public is probably lost to reason
about popular black market drugs. Judges, one hopes, can be
made to look at the evidence and listen to reason. Consider
National Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 103 a case that epitomizes
the dialectical tension in the cases between empiricism and cat-
echism. In that case the United States Customs Service imple-
mented a drug testing program to screen for illegal drug use all
applicants in three categories. On review in the United States
Supreme Court, the Court affirmed that part of the judgment
upholding the urinalysis testing of employees involved in drug
interdiction or required to carry firearms. Justice Kennedy,
carrying on the tradition of Justices Black, Powell and others,
repeated the familiar litany: "drug abuse is one of the most
serious problems confronting our society today. There is little
reason to believe that American work places are immune from
this pervasive social problem . *."..",4 The Court concluded
that "the government has demonstrated that its compelling
interest in safeguarding our borders and the public safety out-
weigh the privacy expectations of employees .... ,,1o5
. The Court split 5-4. Justices Marshall and Brennan dis-
sented. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, wrote a sepa-
rate dissent: "In my view the Custom Service rules are a kind
of immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic oppo-
sition to drug use."' 0 6 For Justice Scalia, drug testing of cus-
toms employees was completely unlike the testing of railroad
103. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
104. Id. at 674.
105. Id. at 677.
106. Id. at 681.
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employees involved in train accidents. In that case,' 0 7 there
was actual evidence that railroad accidents had for many years
been caused by alcohol use, "including a 1979 study finding
that 23% of the operating personnel were problem drink-
ers."' l 8 But the majority opinion, "will be searched in vain for
real evidence of a real problem that will be solved by urine test-
ing of customs service employees."' 0 9
What is absent in the government's justifications - nota-
bly absent, revealingly absent, and as far as I am con-
cerned dispositively absent - is the recitation of even a
single instance in which any of the speculated horribles
actually occurred: an instance, that is, in which the cause
of bribe-taking, or of poor aim, or of unsympathetic law
enforcement, or of compromise of classified information,
was drug use.110
Justice Scalia notes, correctly, that the true basis for the
drug testing program is ideological and symbolic:
The only plausible explanation, in my view, is what the
Commissioner himself offered in the concluding sentence
of his memorandum to Customs Service Employees
announcing the program: "Implementation of the drug
screening program would set an important example in
our country's struggle with this most serious threat to
our national health and security.. . ." What better way to
show that the Government is serious about its "war on
drugs" than to subject its employees on the front line of
that war to this invasion of their privacy and affront to
their dignity? To be sure, there is only a slight chance
that it will prevent some serious public harm resulting
from Service employee drug use, but it will show to the
world that the Service is "clean," and - most important
of all - will demonstrate the determination of the Gov-
ernment to eliminate this scourge of our society!...
Justice Scalia concluded that this justification is unacceptable to
validate an otherwise unreasonable search. He closed by
rejecting the proposition that the end justifies the means.
Close analysis of this kind, so generally powerful in the
law, has so far failed to carry the day on drug issues because the
107. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
108. Id. at 607.
109. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681.
110. Id. at 683.
111. Id. at 686.
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values at stake carry heavy baggage of emotion and symbolism.
Fact, logic and reason become relatively unimportant.
CONCLUSION
During the editing process, the editors raised several ques-
tions that I would like to address in question-and-answer for-
mat, by way of a conclusion.
Q. What difference does it make that the courts use hot
rhetoric to describe drug effects when everyone knows that
drugs are bad?
A. Drugs - referring primarily to marijuana, cocaine and
heroin, the big three in the black market by dollar volume -
are neither good nor bad. They are both. They can facilitate
healing"' and provide pleasure; they can also contribute to ill-
ness, addiction or death. Drugs are not like radioactive waste,
where mere proximity can be lethal. For a court to call drugs
"poisons" is as irresponsibly misleading as calling kitchen
knives murder weapons. With both drugs and kitchen knives,
the ordinary intended purpose is benign. The dangers are
those of misuse and abuse. Further, judicial demagoguery
obscures the vital point that drug use is largely volitional."13
Unless one assumes that they are infantile or insane, drug
users, like other competent adults, must be understood to be
acting in what they perceive as their own best interests.
Responsible public policy on drugs must begin with a pluralis-
tic society's deference to individual self-governance and, inso-
far as harm to others may justify restrictions, a realistic cost-
benefit analysis of the restrictions. The necessary risk assess-
ment has been largely preempted by the prevailing imagery of
misery, destruction and death.
Q. What practical difference does it make that the courts
use loose language in speaking of drugs, drug abuse and drug
trafficking?
A. In The Least Dangerous Branch (1962), Alexander Bickel
argued that the true purpose of the power of judicial review
was to elaborate the principles of the Constitution; otherwise,
the Framers' insulation of the Supreme Court from the political
branches was inexplicable. As we have seen above, the
Supreme Court, and the courts of appeal, frequently address
issues of principle presented by drug cases - questions of
112. L. Grinspoon & J. Bakalar, Medical Uses of Illicit Drugs, in DEALING
WITH DRUGS: CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL (R. Hamowy ed.
1987).
113. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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search and seizure, cruel and unusual punishment, the sixth
amendment right to retain private counsel with drug money,
and so on." 14
In performing the mission of making constitutional law
case-by-case, the courts have skewed the balance sharply in
favor of the power of the State precisely because they are hos-
tage to the simple false idea that drugs are bad and that the
nation confronts a drug crisis. Thus, in balancing individual
rights against the claims of public necessity, the scales ofjustice
are weighted against the Bill of Rights. Accordingly, the courts
have validated every important Congressional "turning of the
screw" in drug enforcement. Instead of cautioning the political
branches that they will be required to make a convincing factual
demonstration of the basis for the war on drugs, the courts
have sent a message that in the field of drug enforcement, vir-
tually anything goes. As Justice Scalia put it in Von Raab,
Supreme Court decisions on drugs represent "a kind of immo-
lation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to
drug use."' 5 The courts, in order to discharge their role as
guardian of the Bill of Rights, should be raising hard questions
about the premises, and proof, that might be claimed to justify
the legislative and enforcement crackdowns. But that is not
intellectually possible, generally speaking," 6 so long as the
tens of millions of citizens who have ever taken illegal drugs are
stigmatized as less-than-human "walking dead" or "moral per-
verts." The result of all the anti-drug invective has been the
slow death of the Bill of Rights' as a necessary sacrifice to the
perceived exigencies of the positivist state besieged by drugs.
Q. What are the ethical implications of the judicial abdi-
cation of responsibility for critical analysis of governmental
claims about drugs and drug abuse?
A. The adversary system employs a dialectical opposition
of the interests of contending parties as a means of achieving
truth in a particular case. In that sense, the adversary system
may be considered an epistemology, a method of coming to
know the truth, although it is restricted by rules of procedure
and evidence that would be intolerable (or so a layman sup-
114. See Crackdown, supra note 6.
115. 109 S. Ct. at 1395.
116. There are occasional exceptions. See United States v. Verdugo-
Urguidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1988): "We also must take great
pains to ensure that the Constitution does not become the first casualty in the
war on drugs."
117. See, e.g., Saltzburg, Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth
Amendment, 48 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1 (1986).
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poses) in a purely scientific inquiry. Still, the basic idea is one
of aggressive inquiry into facts organized by logical methods.
But as the cases discussed above demonstrate, the courts
have passively accepted unproven and often unprovable claims
in reaching conclusions about drug abuse and drug trafficking.
In this respect, they have damaged the ethical basis of the
adversary system, converting it largely into a propaganda tool
for the party line.
My colleague Gerald Uelmen," 8 has offered a particularly
revealing example of how the Court has boot-strapped political
"truth" into legal doctrine. It begins with a concurrence by
Justice Powell in Mendenhall, upholding a warrantless strip
search initiated after an airport drug courier profile stop and
citing a DEA source for "concern [over] the escalating use of
controlled substances.""' 9 In United States v. Montoya de Her-
nandez,12 0 the Court upheld an incommunicado detention and
rectal examination of a traveler, citing Justice Powell's Menden-
hall concurrence as authority for the existence of a "national
crisis in law enforcement caused by the smuggling of illicit nar-
cotics." Finally, in the Von Raab case, Justice Kennedy cited the
Montoya Court's assertion of a "national crisis in law enforce-
ment" as support for the majority's ruling in favor of the Cus-
toms' drug testing program.' 2'
Apart from the incestuous sourcing of the proposition that
there was a national crisis, the statement was false - or at least
not provably true. NIDA's 1988 National Household Survey
on drug abuse reported significant declines in nearly every cat-
egory of drug abuse compared to the 1985 and 1982 surveys.
For example, it noted that rates of marijuana use had been
"steadily decreasing since 1979." 122 This information was well
publicized in the press and available to any modestly skilled
researcher who was interested in learning the facts rather than
simply repeating a preconceived notion. Dean Uelmen con-
cluded that the justices "accept without skepticism . . . that a
national crisis of the greatest conceivable magnitude now
besets us."' 2 3
118. Dean, Santa Clara University Law School, "When Supreme Court
Justices Enlist in a War," address to the Plenary Session of the Drug Policy
Foundation, Nov. 1, 1990, Washington, D.C. [hereinafter Address].
119. 446 U.S. at 561.
120. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
121. 109 S. Ct. at 1392.
122. National Institute of Drug Abuse, National Household Survey 3
(1981).
123. Address, supra note 118, at 2.
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Q. How should the legal profession respond to the judi-
cial blind spot on drugs?
A. There are several practical reforms that might be pur-
sued to improve the situation described in this paper. First,
lawyers must ensure that judges have the benefit of good Bran-
deis briefs when arguing cases with primary or secondary drug
issues. There is no good reason why a skilled advocate could
not make use of the kinds of materials cited in this article.'
24
By the same token, the law schools could make it a lot eas-
ier for the next generation of lawyers and judges 125 to be
knowledgeable by covering basic drug issues in criminal law
courses and by offering drug law and policy courses and semi-
nars. Very few do so at present. Traditional first year criminal
law courses do not generally include drug law. One reason is
that criminal law books are silent on the issue, an incredible
omission in an era when nearly half of felony filings are drug
law violations. The law schools have long had their own blind
spot on the drug issue. 126 They could do a lot more, not only
in teaching but also in sponsoring symposia and supporting
faculty research on the subject. Finally, law journals should
encourage the line of critical thinking represented by this
symposium.12
7
A final recommendation is for more comprehensive
research than has been presented here in this somewhat
impressionistic account of the work of the courts. Thoughts on
a research agenda follow.
124. See BEYOND THE WAR ON DRUGS, supra note 1, at 263 for a
bibliography listing every major work of drug policy analysis published as of
1986, including congressional committee hearings, government monographs,
and many other sources. Lawyers would do well to consult G. UELMEN & V.
HADDOX, DRUG ABUSE AND THE LAw SOURCEBOOK (1989). For additional
information, refer to the Drug Policy Foundation, NORML, and the National
Drug Strategy Network, all in Washington, D.C., which serve as
clearinghouses for researchers.
125. Judicial training institutes should also offer courses that educate
judges about drug policy issues and encourage them to think critically about
alternatives.
126. Another example of neglect is that, on information and belief,
1991 was the first time that the AALS conducted a panel on drug policy since
the author entered legal education in 1975. The author was a speaker at a
Criminal Justice Section panel on "legalization of drugs" in January, 1991 in
Washington, D.C.
127. See also Symposium: The War on Drugs: In Search of a Breakthrough,
11 NovA L. REV. 891-1052 (1987); Symposium: Testing for Drug Use in the
American Workplace, 11 NOVA L. REV. 291-823 (1987); and Symposium: Drug
Decriminalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 457-942 (1990).
NOT THINKING LIKE A LA WYER
A METHODOLOGICAL POSTSCRIPr AND AGENDA
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
This essay does not purport to make a comprehensive sur-
vey of the attitudes of appellate judges as reflected in opinions
dealing with drug issues. The sheer volume of such cases
decided since 1914, and the diversity of issues they decide,
would make such an undertaking impracticable. The goal here
is more sharply focused: to review those decisions in the
United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal that reveal
something of the courts method or general approach -
whether based in empiricism and logic or preconception and
ideology - in deciding drug policy issues.
In most, but not all, of the landmark cases, the Supreme
Court had ruled for the Government. Moreover, it did so in
flights of rhetoric that were unnecessary to the decision of the
particular issues before the Court. Then, in 1981, on the eve of
the contemporary War on Drugs, the Court delivered a strong
message about its own basic orientation. In Albernaz v. United
States,' 28 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, held
that its constitutional interpretation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause would cleave to the statutory intent expressed by Con-
gress. The latter would control the former. Statute would
trump the Constitution.
Of course, Albernaz alone cannot speak for past Courts or
for future ones. But the argument of this essay - that judges
when they have revealed themselves on drug policy issues have
followed political rather than judicial standards of knowledge
- is based on several dozen such cases. The reader might well
ask to what extent is it valid to generalize from the small
number of cases reviewed here to the tens of thousands that
deal with some aspect of the drug issue?
The strength of this assertion must be judged against the
methods that were used in selecting the cases discussed in this
article. Computer searches of the Supreme Court and Federal
databases were used to generate lists of cases. The top tiers of
the judicial pyramid were chosen for three reasons: the
landmark cases are almost all federal cases; the Supremacy
Clause makes federal decisions on constitutional questions
binding on the States, and the Federal Government has since
1914 been the dominant force in the field of drug regulation
and law enforcement.
128. 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981).
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But the goal of this paper was to cull those cases that spoke
to issues of drug policy, that engaged the broader questions of
a principled and effective national drug policy, and that dis-
played some awareness of methodological issues. (None fit the
latter category.) These questions arise, if at all, when a court is
asked to interpret a statute regulating controlled substances or
decide a question of constitutional law bearing on drug law
enforcement powers. To winnow those cases from the routine
cases, search techniques were used combining "drugs" and
"drug trafficking" with limiting phrases, in the same sentence
or paragraph, such as "public health" or "danger to society" or
"morality" or "evil" and the like. Several hundred cases thus
generated were read by me and by research assistants; many
turned out to contain no more than a passing reference to the
search phrase. This reflects the inherent limitations of com-
puter research, which functions best at simple word-recogni-
tion and cannot effectively isolate abstractions or concepts.
In the end, no single search phrase or combination of
phrases could be relied upon to yield up the type of case
sought - a case in which the opinion engaged basic issues of
drug policy in some manner, whether hotly rhetorical or coolly
analytical. Thus, I freely concede that case selection for this
article was necessarily "subjective" in turning on my judgment
whether an opinion fit the foregoing criteria for inclusion. I
should add that these judgments were informed by more than a
decade of experience reading drug law cases as author, teacher
and appellate practitioner.
My students and I did not find very many cases in the
Supreme Court or the federal courts of appeal that fit the pol-
icy model that we were looking for. It thus remains arguable
that the lack of rhetoric in most drug cases supports the view
that most federal appellate judges do a properjob ofjudging in
most drug cases - they apply the law to the facts and eschew
unnecessary statements of a political or policy-oriented charac-
ter. But I think that argument misses the point. The opinions
we have turned up purport to speak for whole courts, if not the
entire federal judiciary. On those relatively few occasions when
judges have troubled to declare themselves on matters of drug
policy, they have done so, with several notable exceptions, in
denunciatory language parallel to that prevailing in the polit-
ical arena. And even when there are dissenting opinions, it is
rare to find a judge distancing himself from the intemperate
and uninformed rhetoric of his brethren.
Still, as a final point, I would like to emphasize that these
observations are offered in a preliminary and tentative way.
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They should be tested by other researchers. I suggest a less
global technique using a narrower query. It would be interest-
ing to focus, for example, on the issue of the oft-assumed con-
nection between drugs and other crimes, especially violent
crimes. Researchers might also find it more manageable to
select a smaller data base, e.g., a state jurisdiction or a federal
circuit for a relatively short time frame. 1983 to the present
would be most reflective of the cases decided in the crackdown
atmosphere of the War on Drugs. The question to be pursued
by the researchers is whether courts are employing proper
decisionmaking techniques on a subject vitally affecting the
rights of millions of persons charged with drug offenses and
also the rights of citizens generally.

